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Scherrer: Scherrer: Missouri Revised Statutes
THE MISSOURI REVISED STATUTES

THE MISSOURI REVISED STATUTES-EVERYTHING'S
UP-TO-DATE IN JEFFERSON CITY?
I. INTRODUCrION

It should be obvious to nearly anyone that statutes, rather than judicial
decisions, are the most important source of the law today. Events and
problems arise too quickly and are too complex for one to expect the
judiciary to have the resources necessary to cope with them. Legislative
bodies, by necessity, must assume the responsibility of providing solutions.
The bulk of the statute books is some evidence that legislators are
not shy in exercising their duty, and yet the increasing mass of enactments
creates special problems. The point to be made is this-as the General
Assembly adds more laws, its members should, at the same time, concern
themselves with repealing their earlier efforts that have been made obsolete
by changes caused by time and events.
At one time in America, it was rare that a law was repealed. Instead,
statutes were allowed to lapse into disuse1 and at times were openly ignored
and disobeyed.2 Legislatures were looking to the present and the future
and could not or did not take the time to erase outmoded statutes from
the books. In addition to the problem of obsolescence, the form and mechanics of early statutes were often defective. They were poorly indexed and
organized, contained ambiguous and unnecessary language, and were redundant and grammatically defective. 3
Starting in the 1920's, a realization developed that some action was
needed to rectify the situation.4 The most widespread and usual response
was to appoint a revisor of statutes and charge him with the task of remedying these deficiencies. In some states this was a continuous process; 5 in other
states a bulk revision would take place periodically.6 The scope of the

1. JoHNsEN, LAw ENFORCEAMT 540 (1930).

2. For a discussion of some specific examples of noncompliance with criminal
laws see Berry, Spirits of the Past-Coping With Old Laws, 19 FLA. L. REV. 24

(1966). The author writes of state-sanctioned defiance of Mississippi's prohibition
laws; nonenforcement of New York's adultery law; and the United States Supreme

Court's treatment of widely flaunted Sunday closing laws.
3. O'Connell, Need for Statutory Revision in Oregon, 23 Oap.

L. REv. 93,
95-96, 101-02, 107, 110 (1943).
4. See Cooper, The Need of a Statute Reviser, 20 ILL. L. R.Ev. 125 (1925);

Corrick, The Establishment and Operation of the Office of Revisor of Statutes in
Kansas, 9 J. Mo. B. 64 (1938); Hodges, How the Revisor Plans Works in Wisconsin, 6 IND. L.J. 37 (1930); Moseley, Continuous Statute Research and Revision in North Carolina, 22 N.C.L. REv. 281 (1944); Ratner, Continuous Statute
Revision, 49 KAN. B.J. 155 (1924).
5. For example, the states of Kansas, Kentucky, Wisconsin, and Florida have
a permanent program authorized to continually work on statutory revision. See
Hodges, supra note 4, at 39; Tribble, Statutory Revision in Florida: What a Few
Young Lawyers Accomplished, 26 A.B.A.J. 498, 499 (1940); and Ratner, supra
note 4.
6. Missouri's constitutions prior to 1945 provided for revision every 10 years,
thus prohibiting any continual revision. See, e.g., Mo. CoNsT. art. IV, § 41 (1875).
In the 1945 constitution the requirement was modified so that continuous statutory
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revisor's authority also differed from state to state. The job of some revisors was limited to indexing and organizing the laws and correcting
mechanical irregularities.7 Other states in addition required their revisors
to study and recommend the repeal of unworkable and outdated laws.8
Missouri has by no means been a leader in shaping its statutes into a
well organized, modern system of codified law. Its constitution, throughout
most of Missouri's statehood has required a revision to be made every 10
years. This was certainly more progressive than many states, which at one
time had no provisions for any sort of program for review.10 Yet other states
recognized the value of a program of continuous statutory revision sooner
than Missouri. 1
Prior to 1945, the constitution was worded in such a way that it was
not possible for the General Assembly to provide for a continuing revision
plan. 12 The constitution of 1945 eliminated this obstacle, 18 and in 1949 the
Revision Publication Act 1 4 was passed by the General Assembly. Section
8.120u specifically established a committee to carry out a continuing
program of statutory revision.
The purpose of this comment is to explore the present statutes of
Missouri, and to point out areas where many of the laws are inconsistent,
outdated, or useless. However, it should be noted at the outset that Missouri has, under its two very competent revisors, Edward D. Summers and
Sam G. Hopkins, managed to keep its books relatively free of these types
of laws. Most of the obsolete and preposterous statutes were repealed at
the time of the decennial bulk revision in 1939.16 Also, under the authority
of the Revision Publication Act of 1949, the revisor and his staff have been
able to do considerable work in correcting mechanical and grammatical
revision would be possible if the General Assembly so directed. See Mo. CONST. art.
III, § 34.

For an early history of statute revision in Missouri, see STATUTE REVISION
CoMM., REPORT, Mo. H. & S. Joum, 50th Gen. Ass'y, app. at 117 (1919). See also
MIssouRI GEN. Ass'y CoMm. ON LEGISLATIVE RESEARcH, ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM

oF CONTINUOUS STATUTORY REvISION, REPORT No. 7, in 3 J. Mo. B. 39 (1947), and
DEBATEs OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MissoURI 5911-22 (1945).
7. Wheeler & Wheeler, Statute Revision: Its Nature, Purpose and Method,

16 TurA. L. REv. 165, 168-70 (1942).
8. Id. These two types of revision are called formal and substantive. Id. at
170. Obviously, if only formal revision is permitted the statute books will still
be burdened with obsolete laws.
9. See Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 34; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 41 (1875). The constitution of 1865 contained no such provision.
10. See authorities cited note 4 supra.

11. See note 5 supra.
12. Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 41 (1875) contained the following language:
In the year 1939 and every ten years thereafter all the statute laws of a
general nature, both civil and criminal, shall be revised, digested and

promulgated in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct.
13. The Missouri Constitution of 1945, by the addition of the phrase "at
least every ten years," authorized the General Assembly to set up a continuous
revision program. Mo. CONST. art. III, § 34.
14. §§ 3.010-.140, RSMo 1969.
15. All statutory references within the text of this article refer to the 1969
edition of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.
16. Missoulu GEN. Ass'Y Comm. ON LEGISLATIVE REsEARCH, supra note 6, at 41.
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errors in the statutes and recommending the passage of bills repealing
17
defective and outmoded laws.
Even though the Missouri statutes have been relatively well-cleansed,
research has revealed certain specific fields where much work is still needed.
Specifically, the laws defining criminal acts and the statutes governing local
government units are the two main areas in which broad, sweeping reform
is so urgently needed that special committees have been formed to remedy
the situation. The problems in these areas are so complex and overwhelming that they far exceed the capabilities or authority of the revisor of
statutes. Only men with expertise in criminal and municipal law could be
expected to cope with and solve the confusion that presently exists. Perhaps
by citing a few examples of some of the deficiencies in the criminal and
local government statutes, this article can generate some publicity for the
serious consideration that needs to be given to the proposals that these two
committees will recommend to the General Assembly for passage into law.
II.

MissouiR CRMiNAL LAW

In Missouri, a Committee to Draft a Modern Criminal Code was established in 1969. The original Committee consisted of 12 men: two appointed by the Supreme Court to represent the judiciary; two appointed
by the Superintendent of the State Highway Patrol to represent law enforcement; two by the Missouri Association of Prosecuting Attorneys to
represent prosecutors; one by the Director of Corrections; one by the Attorney General; two (one from each dominant political party) by the President of the Missouri Senate; and two (one from each dominant political
party) by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This program to
thoroughly revise the substantive criminal laws of Missouri has been funded
by the Missouri Law Enforcement Assistance Council. The Attorney General's Office operates as the subgrantee, disbursing funds and providing
other assistance. The Committee was expanded in 1971, and two more reporters were added, for a total of four.
Presently, Missouri criminal law is found in 12 chapters dealing with
procedure and 9 chapters defining criminal acts and setting punishment,
with other criminal provisions scattered throughout the Revised Statutes.
Even by only a general perusal of the substantive chapters, a few observations can readily be made. First, many of the laws were passed 50 to 70
years ago. Some of the laws date from the territorial laws of 1820. The
terms and style of the statutes seem antiquated. Many of the provisions
cover narrow, specific offenses and are noticeable by the negligible number
of appellate decisions interpreting them.
It is difficult to assess exactly what conclusions can be drawn from the
lack of annotations under so many of the criminal statutes. Perhaps these
laws are so effective that the public is deterred from committing the various
offenses; perhaps the prosecutor has chosen not to file charges against any
violators; perhaps those convicted are not appealing; perhaps the laws are
so clear no appeals need to be taken; or perhaps the laws have ceased to be
of any real use to the public in the prevention of antisocial behavior. A few
17. Summers, Statute Revision in Missouri, 22 Mo. L. Ruv. 14, 16-17 (1957).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

3

Missouri
Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 6
MISSOURI
LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

examples may prove to be helpful to the reader in coming to his own conclusions.
Section 289.120 prohibits a theatrical booking agency from sending
an applicant under 21 years of age to any place where he will sell liquor
or where liquor is sold and prohibits the sending of any applicant regardless of age to a place where he will appear in a strip or nude act or appear
in an act considered lewd, immoral, or indecent. Violation of this statute
is a misdemeanor. No Missouri appellate court has ever decided a case
under this law.
In 1906 the Kansas City Court of Appeals handed down a rather enlightening opinion in the case of State v. Bell.' 8 The court came to grips
with the intricacies of the Missouri statute prohibiting a minor from playing in a pool hall without his parent's consent.19 The court held that the
information was sufficient to sustain the conviction of the owner of the
pool hall for the violation. State v. Bell, is the most recent of three cases
appearing in the annotations under this provision.
It is a felony in Missouri for a person to remove the dead body or
remains of any human being from his grave. 20 Maximum punishment is
five years in the state penitentiary. The most recent annotated case under
this law was decided in 1899,21 but the most interesting opinion was written
one year earlier. In State v. Baker22 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a
conviction on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to find the
defendant guilty of grave robbery. The decision to reverse was made in
spite of evidence that witnesses through illumination provided by lightning
saw a mysterious figure digging in the cemetery at midnight; that the body
of a certain Mrs. W. was subsequently missing from her gravesite; and that
the defendant was heard to remark that he had a "stiff" he hoped to sell
23
for 20 or 40 dollars.
Section 563.030 provides for a sentence of not less than two nor more
than twenty years in the penitentiary if a man forces his wife into a house
of prostitution. The annotations list no cases decided under this law; and
yet this lack of case law seems somehow fair since, no doubt, many a woman
has forced her husband into a house of prostitution and gone unpunished.
There are numerous other criminal statutes with no reported cases
dealing with them, or with the most recent decisions 40 or more years old.24
Possible inferences to be made from the existence of this type of statute
have already been discussed. Perhaps the only conclusion to be drawn is
18. 115 Mo. App. 13, 90 S.W. 757 (K.C. Ct. App. 1905).
19. § 318.090, RSMo 1969.
20. § 563.830, RSMo 1969.
21. State v. Fox, 148 Mo. 517, 50 S.W. 98 (1899).
22. 144 Mo. 323, 46 S.W. 194 (1898).
23. Id. at 328, 46 S.W. at 195.
24. E.g., § 537.285 (penalty for injuring railroad property); § 560.330 (soaping railroad tracks); § 563.050 (prostitute not to be detained for debts contracted);
§ 563.090 (bawdyhouse within 100 yards of a church); § 563.110 (obtaining lease
under false pretenses a felony); § 563.400 (betting on an election); § 563.850 (larceny of articles from grave); § 564.250 (what ingredients prohibited in manufacture of
candies), § 564.520 (shooting at mark on public road a misdemeanor); § 564.550
(injuring lighthouse with specific intent).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/6
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that further investigation as to whether there is a real need for some
statutes is warranted.
Another readily apparent characteristic of Missouri criminal statutes
is the large number of laws that define very narrow, specific criminal acts.
Logically it would seem that many of these statutes that cover related areas
could be combined into a single comprehensive provision. One comprehensive statute would be easier to work with, simplify procedures, clear up
inconsistencies in the elements of the crime, standardize punishment,
eliminate overlapping offenses, and give better notice to the public as to
the state of the law. Again, concrete examples can best illustrate the
problem.
Scattered throughout the statute books are over 30 separate provisions
making it illegal to destroy property of some kind. It is a crime, for example,
to harm or destroy racing pigeons, fruit trees, baggage, electrical equipment, government buildings, levees, rafts, prison buildings, and mileposts. 25
In addition there are separate statutes covering destruction of property by
arson. 26 The entire law establishing criminal conduct with respect to
property needs to be reorganized and simplified into several compact
statutes with varying punishment depending on the nature and value of
the property, the criminal malice involved, and the possibility of harm to
human life accompanying the crime against the property.
In all fairness the General Assembly has done good, but only occasional, work in condensing the large number of related statutes into one
or two compact provisions. The outstanding example is the enactment into
law in 1955 of important legislation related to the crime of stealing.2 7 A
25. These various statutes and their titles are: § 8.150 (penalty for defacing
statehouse-parent or guardian liable for acts of infants); § 12.060 (to injure or
mutilate property of United States a misdemeanor); § 216.460 (conspiracy or assaults by prisoners to guards or inmates, felony, penalty-includes injury to any
penitentiary building or workshop); § 281.140 (penalty for injuring or destroying
trees planted under the supervision of the county highway engineer); § 246.210
(obstruction, impairment, destruction of drainage ditches-penalty); § 537.285 (penalty for injuring railroad property); § 560.540 (destruction of levees and ditches);
§ 246.230 (injury to levee-penalty); § 560.300 (penalty for injuring electrical
equipment); § 560.325 (throwing stone at train while in motion); § 560.330 (soaping railroad tracks); § 560.345 (injuring baggage); § 560.380 (administering poison
to animals); § 560.385 (malicious mischief-penalty); § 560.400 (malicious destruction of property by explosives-penalty); § 560.405 (malicious destruction of fruit
and ornamental trees and other property); § 560.425 (destroying marks on chattel
subject to a security agreement-penalty); § 560.470 (injury to courthouses and
other county buildings); § 560.475 (destruction of trees, shrubs, flowers or ferns
along a highway a misdemeanor); § 560.525 (destruction of bridges, milldamspenalty); § 560.530 (destruction of landmarks); § 560.535 (destroying milepost,
guideboards); § 560.550 (burning raft); § 560.555 (injury to racing pigeons);
§ 560.580 (maliciously firing forest lands a misdemeanor); § 560.590 (wilfully setting outdoor fires-penalty); § 563.750 (desecration of United States flag or emblem,
a misdemeanor-penalty); § 564.540 (injuring lighthouses, misdemeanor); § 564.550
(injuring lighthouse with specific intent-felony).
26. § 560.010 (arson-penalty); § 560.020 (arson if shop, warehouse, factory,
church, public building-penalty); § 560.025 (arson of public or private property);
§ 560.030 (arson of insured property).
27. See Mo. Laws 1955, at 507, §§ 1-5, as amended Mo. Laws 1957, at 374, § 1.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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general statute defining the elements of the offense of stealing was enacted. 28
Its purpose was to eliminate the technical and confusing distinctions between the common law forms of stealing and to simplify the law. 29 A

companion statute set up a standardized penalty provision to cover all
types of offenses. 80 These two comprehensive statutes combined over 30
separate sections into one statute defining the crime and a single statute
setting the punishment. 31 This type of legislation is certainly commendable,
but it is only a small step. Sporadic stabs at reform of the criminal law
will not do. A total revision must be carried out.
Because the criminal laws of Missouri were enacted in a piecemeal
manner over a long period of time, without benefit of an integrated scheme,
there are many inconsistencies. One of the most flagrant examples is the
three statutes covering injury or destruction of levees and drainage ditches.
Section 246.220 provides that anyone who wilfully injures or interferes with
a drainage ditch constructed under the laws of Missouri is guilty of a felony
and shall be punished by not less than two nor more than fifteen years
in the state prison. Conduct of the same nature with respect to a levee is
also a felony under section 246.230, although the maximum sentence is
limited to five years. And yet, in chapter 560, the same acts are punishable
as misdemeanors.8 2 Since there are no cases decided under any of the
three statutes, the conflict has never been resolved. Unhappily, it appears
that the prosecuting attorney's discretion would be extended beyond what
was ever intended if anyone was charged with this type of crime. He would
have the power to decide whether he wanted to subject a violator to the
possibility of imprisonment for a felony or charge him with the lesser
offense, even though the elements of the crime under each statute might be
for all practical purposes identical.
Under section 560.320 it is a misdemeanor for a person to intentionally
interfere with a railroad signaling device or a railroad switch with a resulting stoppage or interference with the operation of a train. Similarly, it is
unlawful under section 560.830 for a person to intentionally place upon
the rails of a railroad soap, grease, or any substance or obstruction, so as
to interfere with the railroad's operations. Violation is also a misdemeanor.
Compare these two statutes with section 564.360 which declares a person
guilty of a felony with a maximum sentence of 20 years if he wilfully and
maliciously places any stone, logs, or other objects on railroad tracks with
the intent to obstruct the passage of an oncoming train. Although the
felonious conduct under section 564.360 must be coupled with intent to
28. § 560.156, RSMo 1969.
29. State v. Perkins, 280 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Mo. 1964).
80. § 560.161, RSMo 1969.
81. All the old larceny statutes were repealed, induding §§ 560.155, .160, .165,
.170, .185, .190, .195, .205, .210, .215, .220, .225, .230, .285, .240, and .245, RSMo
1949. These embezzlement laws were also repealed: §§ 560.250, .255, .260, .265,
.230, .285, .340, RSMo 1949. Miscellaneous statutes condensed into the two general provisions were §§ 560.290, .295, .430, .485, 561.610, .620, .650, .690, .720,
.740, .870, RSMo 1949.
32. § 560.540, RSMo 1969. § 560.605, RSMo 1969 sets the punishment for a
misdemeanor at imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by
fine not in excess of 500 dollars, or by both fine and imprisonment.
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obstruct the railroad, 83 and the two misdemeanor statutes are not dear as
to any requisite intent, the disparity in punishment for the same or very
similar acts seems to open up all three laws to criticism.
Other laws, while not making the same acts unlawful under separate
provisions, can be criticized on the basis that the punishments provided
are inconsistent with other criminal acts of equal culpability. For example,
it is against the law to anchor a boat to railroad structures.3 4 The maximum
penalty for violation of this statute is five years imprisonment. But a
person who wilfully and maliciously shoots into a dwelling house, barn,
stable, garage, motor vehicle, aircraft, or railroad car is exposed to a
maximum criminal liability of only three years in the penitentiary.85
Obviously this later criminal act has at least as much potential for harm
to human life as the unlawful conduct described in the former statute,
and yet the punishments differ significantly. This type of inconsistency
points up the need for further study of all the penalty provisions to determine if they should be adjusted under some sort of uniform system to
make the punishment fit the crime, relative to the rest of the criminal laws.
Finally, even if a statute manages to be free of the shortcomings already noted, the chances are it will still be compatible with the dominant
theme of Missouri criminal law-old age. These statutes are simply out of
touch with the present. Some are antiquated by nature of the crimes they
define. These laws should be repealed outright. Others continue to have
utility for the present, but the terms and language used are time-worn.
These laws should be updated and modernized.
There are a half dozen statutes relating to old-fashioned modes of
travel. Under sections 564.330 and 564.340 it is a misdemeanor to permit
an electric streetcar to operate without protecting the driver against cold
weather. Although citizens of this state may have fond memories of the
trolly car era, the statutes of Missouri are hardly the place to memorialize
"the good old days." Another relic of the past is the drunken stage coach
driver law.8 It was the discovery of this law which inspired the author
of this article to undertake this study. 37 If the law had been properly re33. In the case of State v. Johns, 124 Mo. 379, 27 S.W. 1115 (1894) defendants loosened a rail and then with the intention of obtaining a reward from the
company for preventing a wreck, warned the engineer of the oncoming train in
time to avoid the danger. The supreme court held that it was not necessary to have
the specific intent to injure the railroad, or kill or hurt its employees or passengers.
The court said the criminal act was complete when the track was torn up and approved jury instructions that negated the need for the state to prove the defendants
intended at the time to wreck the train or endanger the lives of anyone. However
it was necessary to show intent to obstruct the passage of the train. Id. at 384-85,
27 S.W. at 1116.
34. § 560.323, RSMo 1969.

351 § 562.070, RSMo 1969.

36. § 564.420, RSMo 1969. This law dates from 1855 and covers drivers of

stages, coaches, wagons, omnibuses, hacks, or other vehicles who are intoxicated
to such an extent that the safety of their passengers is jeopardized. The statute's
language is as dated as its substance. The word "whilst" is used in the text of
the provision.

37. Whenever the author told anyone the subject matter of this article, the
reaction was invariably: "Have you found the drunken stage coach driver law?" It
seems many people cite that law as an example of the critical need for updating
the criminal statutes. No cases are annotated under this statute.
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pealed, the author would not have realized the possibility of writing an
article on Missouri statutes. Instead he would have been relegated to toiling
38
on some dull, traditional law review topic.
A further stroll down memory lane reveals some interesting criminal
offenses involving man and his horse. It is illegal under section 564.500
for a person to run his horse on a public road and disturb and frighten
the horses of his fellow travelers.3 9 Section 564.510 makes it a crime to
race horses on public byways. For those readers who have a difficult time
recalling the last time they saw horses racing on the streets of their city,
the absence of violators can perhaps be traced to the statutory power of
the state highway patrol to stop the rider of any animal traveling on the
40
highways of this state.
Followers of western movies, who remember the old trick of cutting
the straps on the villian's saddle while he was inside robbing the bank,
might find it disconcerting to know that the quick thinking hero of this
ploy could be charged with a misdemeanor. In Missouri it is against the
law for anyone to wilfully and maliciously cut the saddle, bridle, halter,
hitch, rein, buggy or wagon harness of another or wilfully and maliciously
41
remove any tap or nut from someone else's buggy or wagon.
Although the great majority of the criminal laws are still very functional, the style and wording of the statutes need to be modernized. The
term "firkin"4 2 is used in section 561.750, a statute making it unlawful to
sell oleomargarine improperly labeled. Graduates of the University of Missouri Law School at Columbia possess a special expertise with respect to
this word, having been exposed to the strange sounding noun in one of
their first cases in law school.4 3 The prostitution statutes use the oldfashioned term "bawdyhouse;" 44 section 560.345 contains within its pro38. For plentiful examples see prior issues of the Missouri Law Review.
39. In the only case annotated under this statute the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction of Isaac Fleetwood, Jr. The indictment describes
his crime:
[Oin the nineteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord eighteen
hundred and fifty-one, with force and arms, at Ozark County, aforesaid,
[Isaac Fleetwood] then and there did run upon a public road, in common
use, in the county of Ozark, and State of Missouri, a horse, so as to interrupt travelers, and did then and there run said horse at and against one
Elvira Martin, then and there being, thereby greatly hurting and interrupting the said Elvira Martin, then and there being, contrary to the form
of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and
dignity of the state.
State v. Fleetwood, 16 Mo. 448, 449 (1852).
40. § 43.170, RSMo 1969. Actually this law also gives authority to members
of the patrol the right to stop any vehicle, along with charging drivers and riders
with the duty to obey reasonable signals and directions of a patrolman. Part of
the law is perfectly timely and useful, but the remainder seems antiquated.
41. § 560.385, RSMo 1969.
42. A "firkin" is a small wooden vessel or cask of no special size, or any of
several British units of weight. A firkin of butter equals 56 pounds. WESTR.'s
Tzmin NFw INTERNATIONAL DICTONARY 856 (1961).
43. See the case of Dame v. Baldwin, 8 Mass. 517 (1812), which dealt with
what was contended to be a sale of 40 firkins of butter at a market overt.
44. See §§ 563.020, .090, .120, .130, RSMo 1969.
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visions reference to "stage drivers" and "hackmen" carelessly and recklessly
handling a "valise;" ' 45 and under section 559.090 it is manslaughter to
wilfully kill an unborn "quick child" by any injury to the mother of the
child. The old common law phrase "quick with child" describes that time
during pregnancy when the woman feels the fetus moving in the uterus. 4 6
Although many of the criminal statutes cannot be criticized for any
reasons already considered, they, nevertheless, are of questionable need and
value by the very nature of the act sought to be punished. These statutes
should at least be examined by the Committee to Draft a Modem Criminal
Code to determine if the objectives of the criminal system are really
furthered by their presence on the statute books. Examples include the
offense of transporting an uncaged savage animal through the state; 47 the
prohibition against permitting a stallion to service a mare within 300 yards
of a school, college,- or church; 48 the felonious crime of running a bawdyhouse within 100 yards of a church, school, library, or theater; 4 9 and the
laws defining dueling as a crime. 50
As a unit the criminal laws of Missouri present the greatest need for
revision out of the entire body of statutory law. This reform can not be
carried out in -a piecemeal manner by correcting specific provisions such
as those pointed out in this artide. The Committee to Draft a Modem
Criminal Code is not set up for this purpose. Instead, their goal is to revise
the laws completely and recommend to the legislature the adoption of a
comprehensive criminal code. The various references to particular shortcomings of individual criminal statutes were merely an attempt to single
out a few of the many deficiencies in order that the case for reform could
more easily be made. This study of the statutes is only a cursory and superficial overview of some statutes which seem dearly to be in need of change.
The task of exploring in depth more complex weaknesses is left to those
more skilled in the legal theories of criminal law, i.e., the reform committee.
If their efforts fail to effect the necessary changes, the only alternative
that may be left is for some brave soul to risk the consequences of violating
section 560.430. This law makes it a felony for a person to multilate, alter,
or change a law except by legislative process. 51
III. MISSOURI LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

The various laws that regulate local government units run a close
second to the criminal laws in terms of an urgent need for reform. These

45. This statute provides for a fine of up to 100 dollars if a person whose
duty it is to handle the baggage of passengers treats the baggage in a wilful and
reckless manner so as to damage the goods.

46. State v. Emeric, 13 Mo. App. 492, 495 (St. L. Ct. App. 1883), afr'd, 87 Mo.
110 (1885).
47. § 562.280, RSMo 1969.
48. § 563.320, RSMo 1969.
49. § 563.090, RSMo 1969.
50. § 562.090, .100, .110, RSMo 1969.
51. Actually this law was repealed by Mo. Laws 1955, at 507, § A, and incorporated into the stealing statute. See § 560.161 (6), RSMo 1969.
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laws are strewn throughout all the chapters of the revised statutes. 5There
2
are 62 pages of statutes regulating first and second class cities alone.
This is certainly not the first time that the charge has been made that
these laws are confusing, obsolete, and ineffective. Many articles have been
written on the problem 53 and positive steps have been undertaken to
remedy the chaos. 54 Here again the purpose of this article will be to praise
the work that is being done and encourage its eventual implementation by
those who have the power to do so-the General Assembly.
The most persuasive group to call for a complete revision of the statutes
regulating local governmental bodies is the Advisory Council on Local
Government Law set up by Governor Warren Hearnes in 1967. This committee completed a year and a half study and submitted a final report to
the Governor. The Council made an extensive investigation of the statutes
in the area, compiling and sorting them by the class of cities affected and
by particular municipal functions. 55 In its report the Council noted that
most of the laws were passed years ago-some even predating the Missouri
Constitution of 1875.56 When there was a need for a new law or an amendment to existing law, the General Assembly acted with little consideration
of how the new legislation fitted in with prior law.57 There was no systematic development 5sof the law. Instead things were done in a piecemeal,
"as needed" fashion, with the result that the law is a jumbled mass of
hundreds of overlapping, inconsistent, and obsolete statutes, 'describing in
infinite detail how a municipality is to operate. 59
The Council was able to supply ample evidence to support its conclusions. The most glaring examples of useless law on the statute books
of Missouri are the regulations that set forth the powers and limitations of
first and second class cities. The reason for their failure to be of any value
is quite simple-there are no first or second class cities in this state. All
municipalities that could fall within class one or two have instead chosen

52. See Salsich, Local Government in Missouri: The Crossroads Reached, 32

Mo. L. REv. 73 (1967).
53. Salsich & Tuchler, Missouri Local Government: A Criticism of a Critique,
LOCAL
14 ST. L. L.J. 207 (1969); Missoui PUBLIC EXPENDITURE SURVEY, Bmr
6 (1966); GovEaNoR's ADvisoRy COUNCIL'

GOVERNMENT FOR EVERYONE IN Missoum
ON LoCAL GoVERNM ErT LAw, REPORT 3

(1969). In addition, numerous resolutions
have been passed by the Missouri Municipal League recommending modernization
of local government law.
54. In June, 1967, Governor Warren Hearnes appointed a 90-man Advisory
Council on Local Government Law to study and make recommendations dealing
with the laws regulating local government. This report was completed in 1969.
The Council, in summary, proposed increased home rule powers, a simplification
of the statutes in the area, and a modernization of county government. See Salsich
& Tuchler, supra note 53, at 207-09.
55. R-PORT, supra note 53, at 13-14.
56. Id. at ii.

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at iv.
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to become constitutional home rule charter cities. 60 In spite of this there
are over 200 statutes dealing with first and second class city government. 6'
Examination of a few of these statutes helps explain in part why the
citizens of what would be first and second class cities have chosen to govern
themselves under a home rule charter instead of relying on the General
Assembly to supply the authority. Sections 73.110 and 75.110 list the general
corporate powers of first and second class cities. Because non-home rule
municipal corporations only have such powers as are expressly granted by
the legislature, 62 each statute must spell out in lengthy detail the exact
authorized acts that a city may carry out. Thus, whenever a city official
could not find the requisite statutory authority needed to accomplish a
certain task, the legislature, if willing, had to amend the statute to legally
sustain his actions. In addition to the obvious disadvantages of such an
inefficient system, the statutes themselves became a compilation of a host
68
of specific acts passed in a haphazard "as needed" manner.
These laws are never updated. The only way the statutes are changed
is through the continual addition, at the request of local officials, of more
powers. Consequently, Missouri municipal law is a kind of hodgepodge
of the old and the new-a potpourri of nostalgia. It is possible in a single
statute to trace the passage of time as its descriptions move from one era
to another. The best examples are the statutes authorizing a city to license,
tax, and regulate various activities and occupations. Listed among a second
class city's many powers is the right to regulate, tax, and license lightning
rod agents, corn doctors, masseurs, 64 horoscopic views, moving picture
exhibitions, cycloramas, panoramas, public masquerade balls, fortune tellers,
palmists, lung testers, buggies, keepers of knife and board and cane racks,
and magnifying glasses. 6 5 Other vital powers include the authority to enact
regulations concerning the width of tires on wagons, automobiles, and
all vehicles drawn by a horse or powered by electricity, gasoline, or steam; 66
the power to prohibit all games, amusements, or practices tending to frighten horses; 67 and the authority to compel persons having horses or mules
68
standing on the streets to fasten or hitch them.
60. §§ 72.010-.040, RSMo 1969 define by population the permissible classes
of Missouri cities. Class 1, over 65,000; class 2, 27,500-100,000; class 3, 300030,000; and class 4, 500-3,000. A city has only such powers as are specifically
authorized by the statutes for its particular class. However, the Missouri Constitution authorizes any city with a population of 5,000 or more people to construct
and adopt its own charter. Mo. CONST. art VI, § 19. The constitution further states
that a charter city has all the powers the General Assembly has authority to grant
to it. Id. § 19 (a).
61. R. KARsir, THE GOVERNMENT OF MIssouRI 168-73 (1966).
62. Hays v. City of Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 516, 173 S.W. 676 (En Banc 1915);
City of Independence v. Cleveland, 167 Mo. 384, 67 S.W. 216 (1902); Kennedy v.
City of Nevada, 222 Mo. App. 249, 281 S.W. 56 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926).
63. REPORT, supra note 53, at ii.
64. With the recent increase in massage parlor business, this power to regulate
and tax is still quite timely.
65. § 75.110 (18), RSMo 1969. These outdated terms and provisions were included in an amended version of this law that was enacted in 1953.
66. § 75.110 (19), RSMo 1969.
67. § 75.110 (34), RSMo 1969.
68. § 75.110 (62), RSMo 1969.
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Another shortcoming of Missouri local government law that arises
from the character of the statutes is that they seem to induce or encourage
litigation over interpretation of a city's statutory power to act. Such lawsuits are monetarily wasteful and time-consuming. Consider the following
"landmark" decisions. In the case of Moots v. City of Trenton,69 the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the city of Trenton could not levy a license
tax on juke boxes because such machines were not specifically named in
the statute under consideration. And in Keane v. Strodtman,70 a municipal
ordinance imposing a license tax on persons engaged in the business of
erecting, maintaining, and repairing awnings was invalid for lack of any
authority under the statutes. These two cases and others like it have little
significance for anyone but the parties directly affected, although advocates
of home rule could argue that adoption of a charter would eliminate
disputes of this nature. Apparently these proponents must have been successful in view of the complete absence of first and second class cities still
taking their mandate to govern from statutes.
The remainder of the cities in Missouri are mostly third or fourth
class cities. (Missouri also has towns, villages, and special charter cities.)
71
The state constitution forbids more than four classifications of cities.
Sections 72.010-.040 set up four categories of cities by population. 72 In spite
of the constitutional prohibition the Governor's Advisory Council in its
research discovered over 167 additional classifications of municipalities
based either on population or location.73 It would seem logical to conclude
69. 358 Mo. 273, 214 S.W.2d 31 (1948).
70. 323 Mo. 161, 18 S.W.2d 896 (En Banc 1929).

71. Mo. CoNsr. art. VI, § 15. However, the Missouri Supreme Court has held

that the General Assembly can make further classifications without regard to the
general classifications. City of Lebanon v. Schneider, 349 Mo. 712, 163 S.W.2d 588
(En Banc 1942).
72. See note 60 supra.
73. REPORT, supra note 53, at 12. Some of these classifications and sections
of the Missouri Revised Statutes referring to them are as follows:
Cities of less than 30,000 inhabitants
Public Parks, § 90.500, RSMo 1969.
Power to build and maintain sidewalks, § 88.863, RSMo 1969.
Cities of 30,000 or less
Storm sewers along railroad right of way, § 398.670, RSMo 1969.
Cities of 100,000 inhabitantsor over
Fire department regulation, § 87.380, RSMo 1969.
Cooperation of cities with drainage districts for flood protection, § 70.330,
RSMo 1969.
Municipal and school election procedure in Clay County, § 119.040,
RSMo 1969.
Cities of 300,000 to 700,000 inhabitants
Cost of appeal to be paid by city when the defendant is acquited of violating a city ordinance, § 98.027, RSMo 1969.
Cities of 400,000 inhabitantsand over
Scales of weights and measures, § 413.380 (2), RSMo 1969.
Additional bonding authorization for national parks or plazas, § 95.527,
RSMo 1969.
Cities of over 450,000 inhabitants
Pension system for city employees, § 95.540, RSMo 1969.
This information is quoted from Salsich, Local Government in Missouri: The CrossroadsReached, 32 Mo. L. REv. 73, 75 n.14 (1967).
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that given the large number of different statutes and the numerous classifications in this area of the law, inconsistencies would be prevalent. And,
in fact, such a conclusion can rather easily be proved. Sections 122.100,
122.170, and 122.500-.590 contain regulations applicable to elections in
first and second class cities. There are no such provisions covering third
and fourth class cities. Sections 79.490-.510 set up procedures for the disincorporation of fourth class towns, but no statutes provide this procedure
for the other three classes. 74 In fourth class cities law enforcement officials
may enforce state law and municipal ordinances, but policemen in third
class cities do not have this dual authority.7 5
The governing body of a first class city has the power to prohibit
kite flying and hoop rolling when it would frighten horses,7 6 and the
power to regulate the use of candles and other lights in stables and houses.77
This vital and critical regulatory power has not been extended to second
class cities. Under section 94.110 a third class city council has the power
and authority to levy and collect a license tax on feather renovators. No
other municipality can do this. The fourth class cities can claim that they
are the only cities in Missouri with the power to regulate and collect a
license tax on tippling houses. 78 For some unknown reason in 1945 the
fourth class cities lost their power to license and tax hay scales (by amendment to section 94.270), but fortunately for third class cities the power
to tax this source of revenue still exists. 79 Also, by amendment in the same
0
year, the fourth class cities were deprived of their right to tax drummers,8
8
but all other classes of cities still possess this authority. 1 Why these inconsistencies exist can not be answered. Although it is only speculation, perhaps
the failure to coordinate the local government statutes at the time of enactment and the fragmented manner in which they developed contributed
to the problem.
At the time it published its report, the Advisory Council proposed
to wipe these statutes off the books and replace them with a single "General
Law City Code."8 2 This code was to be the law governing all cities' operation except those controlled by constitutional and special charter.88 The
Council started working to compile all the statutes affecting municipalities
by class and by function with the goal of drafting the general law from
this compilation.8 4 Unfortunately, a check with authoritative sources at
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

supra note 53, at 13.
§§ 85.561 (3), .610, .620, RSMo 1969; Salsich, supra note 73.
§ 73.110 (34), RSMo 1969.
§ 73.110 (50), RSMo 1969.
§ 94.270, RSMo 1969.
§ 94.110, RSMo 1969.
Mo. Laws 1945, at 1224, § 1. Webster's Dictionary gives several definitions
REPoPT,

of the word drummer. A drummer can be a traveling salesman; one who plays
a drum; or a large cockroach (Blaberus giganteus) of Central America that beats
on wood as a sexual call. W ssrTER's THum NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 695
(1961).
81. §§ 94.110, 75.110 (18), 73.110 (17), RSMo 1969.
82. REPoRT, supra note 53, at ii.
83. Id. at 13-14.
84. Id.
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the Missouri Municipal League and the state Department of Community
Affairs has shown that the project has stalled. Apparently, pressure to write
a general code has slackened due to the recent passage of the home rule
amendment which permits smaller cities to draft their own charters. And
yet this mass of statutory law still clutters the books. For reasons painfully
clear, someone must resume work on the code so that the General Assembly
can enact it into law as quickly as possible.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is obvious that there are problems with the statutes of Missouri.
An inexperienced person might place the blame with the Revisor of Statutes.
The holder of this office, it is true, is charged with the continuous revision
of the state's laws. But, in Missouri, it is not the Revisor's job to work for
major and drastic changes in the substantive law. Instead he is charged
with correcting mechanical defects in the law. He organizes and indexes
the statutes and corrects minor errors. s5 So it is wrong to place the blame
on the Revisor.
A statute book which has been revised by competent persons may still
contain laws that are obsolete and inconsistent with the needs of modem
society.80 Ultimately, the General Assembly must take the responsibility
and free current law from the grip of outdated law. Unfortunately, legislators have all they can do to keep abreast of current problems. There is
too little time that can be devoted to the task of what one might call
negative legislation. There is a definite need for a standing body to continually study areas of the law that need major overhauls and propose
recommended alternatives to the General Assembly.
The present situation in Missouri is not good enough. Through no
fault of his own, the Revisor of Statutes is just not able to suggest needed
substantive changes in the law and in actuality, he should not have tothis is not his job.87 At present the impetus for reform of the law comes
from many sources. Three very important sources that the General Assembly
depends on are bar, ad hoc, and supreme court committees. These committees are composed of people, who, in addition to their regular jobs as
lawyers, judges, and law school professors, have volunteered their time to
take on this extra responsibility. The Committee to Draft a Modem Criminal Code for Missouri, for example, is an ad hoc committee. Although it
and other groups like it perform valuable work, it is at best a makeshift
88
arrangement.
By far the most superior plan is that adopted by the state of New York.
The Law Revision Commission has been in existence in that state for over
35 years. It is a permanent body of full time legislative experts and advisors
whose job is to aid the legislature in keeping the law in touch with modem

85.
86.
16 TUL.
87.

See text accompanying note 17 supra.
Wheeler & Wheeler, Statute Revision: Its Nature, Purpose and Method,
L. Rv. 165, 197 (1942).
See text accompanying note 17 supra.
88. O'Connell, Need for Statutory Revision In Oregon, 23 ORE. L. REv. 93,

123 (1943-44).
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conditions and repealing obsolete law. 89 The Commission only- makes recommendations; it has no legislative power. 90 It receives suggestions from
all over the state as to potential areas of needed law reform.91 It examines
appellate opinions for judicial pleas to the legislature to change case law;9 2
it considers proposed changes in the law suggested by the American Law
Institute; and it studies proposals for uniform legislation in this country.9 3
The advantages of such an agency are obvious. There is one body
charged with updating laws. Members of the bar are not asked to voluntarily
serve on ad hoc committees. It is not necessary to wait until certain laws
degenerate to such a point that legal reform can not be put off any longer.
The members of a body such as that implemented in New York would
constantly seek the better solution. Reform would thus be achieved before
crisis.
The advantages to the development of the private law are especially
beneficial. The impetus for change in the private sector of the law is traditionally slow. Legal practitioners familiarize themselves with pitfalls and
deficiencies and are thus able to compensate for weaknesses in the law.
Because of this no one really takes the initiative to push through reforms
in private law. It tends to be ignored. 94 When bad laws affect wide segments
of the public, the legislature is eventually under so much pressure that
change is brought about. But this is not the case with laws affecting private
transactions and dealings between individuals. If you do not want to get
tripped up by some anachronism in Missouri law, the only advice given
is, see your lawyer. How many times have law students heard their torts,
contracts, or trusts professors remark that Missouri law is out of touch;
that the courts are adhering to faulty precedents; that the rationale behind
a certain statute or judge-developed law is completely wrong. But who
takes the ultimate responsibility in this area? What is everybody's business
tends to be nobody's business, and thus the defects are perpetuated by
the failure to take action.
The establishment in Missouri of a permanent body like the New York
Law Revision Commission would eliminate this inaction. It would relieve
the legislature of much tedious and time-consuming work and establish
a central body through which all suggestions for reform of the law, especially
in the private area, could be channeled for further study. This special
body would have the responsibility of freeing our laws of obsolete provisions
through recommendations to the General Assembly for passage of new
laws. It would then be possible to pinpoint someone in Missouri who could
be the initiator of changes in our laws; someone charged with the obligation
and accountability to do what needs to be done.
The adoption of a plan similar to the New York Commission would

89. N.Y.
90. N.Y.
91.
92.
93.
94.

STATE LEG.
STATE LEG.

Doc. No. 50, at 54 (1934).
Doc. No. 70, at 10 (1924).

N.Y. STATE LEG. Doc. No. 60, at 8 (1935).
Id. at 15.
Id.
Stone &cPettee, Revision of Private Law, 54 HIv. L. REv. 221, 224 (1940).
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not mean that the office of Revisor of Statutes would be abolished. On
the contrary its work is still very important. Perhaps the ultimate solution
would be the establishment of some sort of "legislative service bureau"
whose work would include (1) substantive law reform, (2) procedural reform, (3) statutory revision and editing, and (4) aid to the members of the
legislature in bill-drafting and research. 95 Implementation of a plan such
as has been suggested would be a positive step towards upgrading legislative skills.
Rc;AHw B. SCHERRER

95. Id. at 239.
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